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 This is a revised and extended version of the paper originally titled DSGE and Beyond - Computable and 
Constructive Challenges, which was prepared for presentation at the National Bank of Poland conference on 
DSGE and beyond -- expanding the paradigm in monetary policy research?, to be held in Warsaw, on 29-30, 
September, 2011. This is one of a series of five papers, eventually to be collected in book form as, 
Unfashionable Macroeconomics. Apart from this one on Policy, the others are on Money, Cycles, Growth and 
Development. The methodological theme unifying all of them is what I have come to call `The Pernicious 
Influence of Mathematics in the Formalization of Economic Theory.' The pretense that mathematical formalism 
can provide unambiguous answers to problems that are essentially an intractable combination of economics, 
ethics, politics and philosophy is, I claim, at least due to a stunted acquaintance with only a small part of 
mathematics, mathematical logic and metamathematics. It does not follow that I stand to defend the alternative 
stance that a complete knowledge of these three fields would provide the unambiguous answers many 
economists seek -- even if `complete knowledge' can be given formal content in any meaningful way. Abstract
The genesis and the path towards what has come to be called the DSGE
model is traced, from its origins in the Arrow-Debreu General Equilibrium model
(ADGE), via Scarf￿ s Computable General Equilibrium model (CGE) and its
applied version as Applied Computable General Equilibrium model (ACGE), to
its ostensible dynamization as a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium (RCE). It
is shown that these transformations of the ADGE ￿including the fountainhead
￿ are computably and constructively untenable. The policy implications of
these (negative) results, via the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics
in particular, and against the backdrop of the mathematical theory of economic
policy in general, are also discussed (again from computable and constructive
points of view). Suggestions for going ￿ beyond DSGE￿are, then, outlined on the
basis of a framework that is underpinned ￿from the outset ￿by computability
and constructivity considerations.
JEL Codes: C02, C62, C68, D58, E61
Keywords: Computable General Equilibrium, Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium, Computability, Constructivity, Fundamental Theorems of Welfare
Economics, Theory of Policy, Coupled Nonlinear Dynamics
21 A Preamble
"... the dreadful permanence of a certain second in one￿ s temporary
life."
James Kirkup: These Horned Islands, p.87 (The Macmillan Com-
pany, NY, 1962)
At least until the advent of the recent crisis, the dominance of the DSGE ap-
proach to macrodynamics seemed to have been the accepted benchmark to any-
one attempting serious modelling of policy with rigorous microeconomic foun-
dations. This consensus vision ￿ controversial and not unchallenged even in
the best of times - has come under some increasing sceptical scrutiny, to put it
mildly, in the last three years.
Many competent critiques of the DSGE methodology, with alternative vi-
sions ably formulated, have come to be considered in all circles where, previ-
ously, there was an almost proverbial ￿ one-size-￿ts-all￿philosophy to the math-
ematical modelling of rigorously founded macroeconomics. The New Keynesian
monopoly of alternatives to DSGE visions has, thus, been diluted, albeit not ￿
at least till now ￿entirely supplanted.
Most importantly and interestingly, the many contributions to varieties of
boundedly rational, agent-based, economic dynamics, have taken on the DSGE
visions and methodology squarely and critically, with seemingly challenging re-
sults in formal, rigorous, computational frameworks.
However, all the way from the core contributions to DSGE modelling, phi-
losophy and visions, to current fashions in agent-based economic and ￿nancial
modelling, in ostensibly explicit computational frameworks, the underlying as-
sumption seems to have been an uncritical acceptance of the claims on the
mathematical structure of the computable and constructive foundations of the
basic pillars of general equilibrium theory - from their origins in the classic of
Arrow-Debreu General Equilibrium (ADGE), through Scarf￿ s development of
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) theory, to DSGE via Recursive Com-
petitive Equilibrium (RCE).
This paper is a contribution to the critique of foundations of DSGE mod-
elling, from an explicitly computable and constructive mathematical point of
view. However, it is a part of the broader framework and vision that this au-
thor has come to call Algorithmic Economic Theory1, within which the following
eight results have been derived2:
i. Nash equilibria of (even) ￿nite games are constructively indeterminate.
ii. Computable General Equilibria are neither computable nor constructive.
iii. The Two Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics are Uncom-
putable and Nonconstructive, respectively.
iv. There is no e⁄ective procedure to generate preference orderings.
1More recently I have begun using Diophantine Economics to describe the ￿eld which
began as Computable Economics more than twenty ￿ve years ago.
2Apart from the sixth result, which is due to the pioneering work of Michael Rabin ([50])
in 1957, the rest are due to this author.
3v. Recursive Competitive Equilibria (RCE), underpinning the Real Business
Cycle (RBC) model and, hence, the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) benchmark model of Macroeconomics, are uncomputable.
vi. There are games in which the player who in theory can always win
cannot do so in practice because it is impossible to supply him with e⁄ective
instructions regarding how he/she should play in order to win.
vii. The theoretical benchmarks of Algorithmic Game Theory are uncom-
putable and non-constructive.
viii. Emergent formalisms in Agent-Based Economic Modelling have no foun-
dations in any kind of rigorous algorithmic formalism and, hence, epistemolog-
ically vacuous.
In the next section an attempt is made to set the theme and mathematical
content of this paper against the noble interwar traditions of Polish Mathemat-
ics, also as a tribute to the tenacity and verve with which it was developed by
some of the 20th century￿ s greatest mathematicians, many of whom - at least
in terms of aspects of the very particular mathematization of economics ￿were
Polish. In section 3, a brief foray ￿entirely inadequate from any serious point of
view ￿into aspects of non-traditional mathematics (and non-traditional logic),
relevant for making sense of the rest of the paper, is attempted. In section
4, I re￿ ect on the (mathematical) epistemology of computation, hopefully in
a sense relevant for the broader themes that underpin the main focus of the
paper. Section 5, as an immediate prelude to the main technical section of this
paper, provides an outline of the variety of ways in which the theory of economic
policy was formalised mathematically without, however, being anchored in the
fundamental theorems of welfare economics, although computation played some
decisive role in all of them ￿almost without any computability or constructive
underpinnings. I qualify with the word ￿ almost￿because the Phillips-inspired
derivation of proportional, derivative and integral macroeconomic stabilisation
policies were developed within an explicit analogue computing framework3. In
Section 6, aimed to contain the main focussed themes of the paper, an attempt
at dissecting the computable and constructive claims of the varieties of general
equilibrium models that form the foundations of DSGE models is presented; a
brief foray into the untenable claims of aspects of agent-based economic mod-
elling is also included. The brief concluding section suggests some constructive
and computable ways of going ￿ beyond DSGE￿ .
3The full fascinating details of this story is documented, with the original articles by
Phillips included, in the forthcoming Special Issue of Economia Politica, Vol. XXVIII, #
3, commemorating the 60th anniversary of the construction and implementation of the Phillips
Electro-Hydraulic Analogue Computing Machine, also known as the MONIAC (MOnetary
National Income Analog Computer: a name coined by Abba Lerner, possibly with the idea
of mimicking ENIAC in some way).
42 A Brief Homage to ￿ Polish Mathematics￿ -
and Economics.
"The work of men who have founded and developed Fundamenta
Mathematicae has had a deep in￿ uence on the mathematical progress
of the past quarter-century. Starting with Jamiszewski and Sier-
pi· nski, there has grown up a fruitful movement with which American
mathematicians have had intimate and e⁄ective relations. The work
in Topology and in abstract spaces is now recognized throughout
mathematics as of fundamental character; the Polish School under
such men as Banach and Kuratowski constituted, before the present
catastrophe (1939), one of the outstanding mathematical groups."
Marshall Stone (quoted in [27], pp. 15-16; second set of italics,
added)
Stone￿ s handsome tribute, concentrating on set theory, topology and func-
tional analysis, does not go far enough: he has forgotten the pioneering contri-
butions made by the Polish School, in that heroic twenty-year period of 1919
￿ 1939, to recursion theory, recursive analysis and metamathematics ￿ and
forgotten, also, to include ￿ women￿ 4. If the economic theoretic crown jewels
of orthodox mathematical economics are the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium exis-
tence theorem and the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, then the
mathematical crown jewels that underpin them are, surely relevant ￿xed point
theorems (Brouwer, Knaster-Kuratwoski-Mazurkiewicz [KKM], Kakutani) and
separating and supporting hyperplane theorems (especially the Hahn-Banach
theorem)5. Elementary texts on equilibrium theory ￿for example [22] (with
its copious misprints, inaccuracies ￿including the dating of the classic KKM
theorem ￿and other infelicities) ￿pay at least lip service to what I have come
to call the Polish Fix Point Theorem in proving the existence of an ADGE, and
thereby the crucial role it plays in the ￿rst fundamental theorem of welfare eco-
nomics (and in Negishi￿ s method, see, below, next section)6; and re￿ ections by
4I have in mind, here, the remarkable example of Helena Rasiowa (cf. [52], and refereneces
therein). Indeed, a most readable and, although slightly dated by now, fairly comprehen-
sive account of the contributions of Polish mathematicians in the interwar period ￿and the
extraordinary role played by Fundamenta Mathematiacae in the dissemination of their pio-
neering contributions to set theory, topology and functional analysis ￿is also provided by a
woman scholar, Sister Mary George Kuzawa (see [27] & [28]). Indeed, an unwritten part of
the story of mathematical economics are the roles played by the mathematics disseminated by
Fundamenta Mathematicae and Composito Mathematica - the latter founded by Brouwer, to
counter his dismissal, by Hilbert, from the editorial borad of Mathematische Annalen. A fas-
cinating description of the story of the founding and vicissitudes of Composito Mathematica,
and Brouwer￿ s active and tragic role in it, can be found in [73].
5Unlike many other historians of the development and evolution of mathematical eco-
nomics, I do not subscribe to the view that Bourbaki was essential in this story. Hilbert￿ s
Dogma in proof theory and its metamathematics (see my recent paper, [80] for a fairly de-
tailed de￿nition and discussion) and von Neumann￿ s less than candid acknowledgements to
alternative trends in the possible mathematization of economics were the decisive factors in
the eventual path and structure that was taken by orthodox mathematical economics.
6Few bread-and-butter mathematical economists and even fewer textbook writers seem to
5the pioneers of mathematical economics (for example [12], pp. 268-9) empha-
sise the crucial role played by the Hahn-Banach theorem in demonstrating the
(non-constructive) validity of the second fundamental theorem of welfare eco-
nomics. Yet, it is von Neumann and Bourbaki who are considered the founding
fathers of the mathematics and the mathematical methods of orthodox math-
ematical economics and formal economic theory - not the legions of interwar
Polish mathematicians who framed, codi￿ed and formalised set theory, topol-
ogy and functional analysis (to which the contributions of von Neumann and
Bourbaki is a proverbial ", at least in my opinion).
But the homage I wish to pay, particularly in the context of the computable
and constructive philosophy and methodology underpinning the framework of
this paper, is to the pioneering contributions by legions of great Polish recursion
theorists, mathematical logicians and metamathematicians ￿all the way from
Post in 1921 ([48]), via Mazur in (about) 1928 (see [43], especially chapter 6),
Tarski in 1933 ([68]), culminating in the Banach-Mazur results of 1936-8, on
computable analysis ([2]), fully documented, alas, only after WW II, in as late
as 1963 ([34]).
A decent history of Polish contributions to computability theory, mathemat-
ical logic and metamathematics is not something that can be summarised in a
brief section of a paper aimed at issues that are peripheral to deep questions
of the development of scienti￿c theories. I shall, therefore, con￿ne myself to
highlighting one specially important contribution, which can be said to be the
fountainhead of computable economics.
In my various writings on Computable Economics, I have consistently main-
tained that the absolute pioneer of the subject, long before I gave it the name
by which I am now referring to it, was Michael Rabin ([50]). His own starting
point was the classic Gale-Stewart game ([16]). This line of research was later
taken up by Jones and Matiyasevich, particularly in the context of the latter￿ s
fundamental results on the negative solution to Hilbert￿ s Tenth Problem (see
[33] and for a fairly full discussion also [74]). However, a proper study of the
origins should really begin with the Banach-Mazur Game ([43]), show how the
Gale-Stewart-Game is a special case of it, and then place the former in the con-
text of the remarkable e⁄ectivisation achieved by Rabin. To this can be added
the Polish contribution to ￿nding a rationale for the axiom of determinateness
to make such game determinate, and to free the subject from the ￿ shackles￿of
the axiom of choice (cf., [67]).
In this paper I shall not explore the possibilities o⁄ered by any of this line of
research for reorienting the mathematization of economic theory in the direction
of Computable Economics; nor will I be able to expand on using Computable
Analysis, in the Polish tradition, for enriching algorithmic analysis of economic
processes. But these are lines of research that are squarely within the discipline
be aware that the three classic results, the Brouwer ￿x-point theorem, Sperner￿ s Lemma and
KKM, are mutually equivalent in the sense that each one can be deduced from the other (see,
[44]). Thus, in an elementary sense the proof of the non-constructivity of the one follows from
that of any of the other two. This latter point has, to the best of my knowledge, never been
acknowledged in the vast literature on mathematical economics.
6of Computable Economics, and their Polish origins will be spelled out in greater
detail in future work ￿by me and my collaborators and students.
Finally, I must acknowledge my debts as an economist to the remarkably
original and stimulating works by three Polish economists of exceptional orig-
inality: Miha￿Kalecki, Oskar Lange and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan. Almost all
my work in macroeconomic dynamics, business cycle theory, growth and de-
velopment theories were seriously inspired by the classic works by Kalecki and
Rosenstein-Rodan in the early 1930s ￿and, then, through their various contribu-
tions in the 1940s and the quarter of a century after WW II. Lange￿ s in￿ uential
writings on general equilibrium theory, beginning with his contribution to the
debate with Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and others, on the socialist calculation
debate, and subsequently through his work on welfare economics and general
equilibrium theory inspired me, albeit negatively (compared to the way Kalecki
and Rosenstein-Rodan stimulated me positively). I consider myself privileged
to have been educated in Lund and Cambridge, where the classic articles by
Kalecki, Lange and Rosenstein-Rodan were part of the assigned reading for
graduate courses in macroeconomics, growth and cycle theories, development
theory and general equilibrium theory. On re￿ ection, now forty years after I
began my education as an economist, it may not be an exaggeration to confess
that ￿with the exception of the writings of the Swedish followers of Wicksell, the
Norwegian ￿ School￿of the successors of Frisch and Haavelmo and the Cambridge
(both the ￿ old￿and the ￿ new￿Cambridges) ￿ descendents￿of Keynes ￿the con-
tributions by this trio of Kalecki, Lange and Rosenstein-Rodan have remained
life-long sources of fertile ideas for me to re￿ ect on, time and again.
I do not think I am being facetious when I also confess that Rosenstein-
Rodan￿ s variation of Marshall￿ s unfortunate epigraph to his Principles ([54]), has
been my intellectual motto ￿especially from the point of view of mathematical
epistemology ￿after my ￿ conversion￿to Computable Economics: Natura Facit
Saltum.
3 An Ultra-Brief Non-Traditional Mathemati-
cal Excursus
"This is a specimen of intuitionist reasoning in topology, and
in particular an illustration of the consequences of the invalidity
of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem in intuitionism, for the validity
of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem would make the classical and
intuitionist forms of the ￿xed-point theorms equivalent."
[5], p. 1; italics added.
Brouwer, in the above quote, is ￿of course ￿referring to his celebrated ￿xed-
point theorem, widely used in mathematical economics in its original form, or
in one or another of its ￿ generalizations￿ , by Kakutani, KKM, etc. On the other
hand, just because a ￿xed-point theorem is invalid from an intuitionistic point
7of view7 does not necessarily mean that it is non-constructive or uncomputable
from mathematical points of view claiming allegiance to other forms of con-
structivism and varieties of computability theories. The point here, however,
is the role of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem and its intrinsic undecidable
disjunctions, which make any theorem invoking it in its proof fundamentally
non-constructive and uncomputable from any (known) mathematical point of
view.
In this author￿ s considered and studied belief, the key advance from the
pure mathematics of general equilibrium theory and game theory is the claim
by adherents of CGE, RCE, RBC, SDGE and, most recently, also by those
practitioners of algorithmic game theory (AGE), that the theoretically proved
equilibrium existence theorems, in the respective ￿elds, can be given construc-
tive and computable content. This is a belief based on explicit claims by eminent
practitioners of CGE, RCE, RBC, SDGE and AGE8. If these claims are to re-
tain their validity from this particular point of view, the mathematics in which
their formalism is clothed must be constructively or computably meaningful.
As Jeremy Avigad perceptively noted, recently9:
￿[The] adoption of the in￿nitary, nonconstructive, set theoretic,
algebraic, and structural methods that are characteristic to mod-
ern mathematics [....] were controversial, however. At issue was
not just whether they are consistent, but, more pointedly, whether
they are meaningful and appropriate to mathematics. After all, if
one views mathematics as an essentially computational science, then
arguments without computational content, whatever their heuristic
value, are not properly mathematical. .. [At] the bare minimum,
we wish to know that the universal assertions we derive in the sys-
tem will not be contradicted by our experiences, and the existential
predictions will be borne out by calculation. This is exactly what
Hilbert￿ s program10 was designed to do.￿
[1], pp. 64-5; italics added
Thus, my claim is that the existential predictions made by the purely the-
oretical part of mathematical economics, game theory and economic theory
￿ will [not] be borne out by calculations.￿ There is, therefore, a serious epis-
temological de￿cit ￿in the sense of economically relevant knowledge that can
7We are ￿ advised￿ , in a recent advanced textbook in Real Analysis with Economic
Applications ([42], p. 279, footnote 47), ￿ If [we] want to learn about intuitionism in mathe-
matics￿ , to do so ￿ in [our] spare time, please￿! The footnote in which this ￿ advice￿appears is
replete with elementary mathematical and biographical errors (on Brouwer).
8Explicit references to substantiate this claim can be found in [75] and [76], as well as in
the sequel, below.
9Avigad￿ s important observation was made in the context of The Mathematics of Ergodic
Theory. It is only necessary for the critically minded mathematical economist or economic
theorist simply to substitute ￿ economic￿for ￿ ergodic￿and nothing would change in the impli-
cations.
10I have tried to make the case for interpreting the philosophy and methodology of math-
ematical economics and economic theory in terms of the discipline of Hilbert￿ s program in
[79].
8be processed and accessed computationally and experimentally ￿in all of the
above approaches, claims to the contrary notwithstanding, that is unrecti￿able
without wholly abandoning their current mathematical foundations. This is an
epistemological de￿cit even before considering the interaction between appeals
to in￿nite ￿even uncountably in￿nite ￿methods and processes in proofs, where
both the universal and existential quanti￿ers are freely used in such contexts,
and the ￿nite numerical instances11 with which they are, ostensibly, ￿ justi￿ed￿ .
This epistemological de￿cit requires even ￿ deeper￿mathematical and philosoph-
ical considerations in Cantor￿ s Paradise12 of ordinals13 , where combinatorics,
too, have to be added to computable and constructive worlds to make sense of
claims by various mathematical economists and agent based modeling practi-
tioners.
4 Notes on the Epistemology of Computation in
Economics
￿Computer science ... is not actually a science. It does not
study natural objects. Neither is it, as you might think, mathemat-
ics; although it does use mathematical reasoning pretty extensively.
Rather, computer science is like engineering - it is all about getting
something to do something, rather than just dealing with abstrac-
tions ... . ...But this is not to say that computer science is all
practical, down to earth bridge-building. Far from it. Computer
science touches on a variety of deep issues. ... . It naturally en-
11SerØnyi￿ s ([59]) very recent re￿ections and results on this issue will play an important part
in the theoretical underpinnings to be developed in this project (p.49; italics added):
￿An argument deriving the truth of a universal arithmetical sentence from that
of its numerical instances suggests that the truth of the numerical instances has
some kind of epistemological priority over the truth of the sentence itself: our
knowledge of the truth of the sentence stems from the fact that we know all
its numerical instances to be true. .. I shall show that it is just the other way
around. ... [T]he source of our knowledge of the truth of the totality of its
numerical instances is the truth of the sentence itself.￿
12Hilbert did not want to be driven out of ￿ Cantor￿ s Paradise￿([21]; p.191):
￿ No one shall drive us out of the paradise which Cantor has created for us.￿
To which the brilliant ￿ Brouwerian￿response, if I may be forgiven for stating it this way, by
Wittgenstein was ([86]; p.103):
￿ I would say, "I wouldn￿ t dream of trying to drive anyone out of this paradise."
I would try to do something quite di⁄erent: I would try to show you that it is
not a paradise ￿ so that you￿ ll leave of your own accord. I would say, You￿ re
welcome to this; just look about you." ￿
13Where ￿ Ramsey Theory￿ , ￿ Goodstein Sequences￿ and the ￿ Goodstein theorem￿ , reign
supreme. In work in progress these issues are dealt with in some detail, as they pertain
to bridging the ￿ epistemological de￿cit￿in economic theoretical discourse in the mathematical
mode.
9courages us to ask questions about the limits of computability, about
what we can and cannot know about the world around us.￿
[14], p.xiii; italics added.
Feynman, with characteristic perspicacity, highlights the epistemological ba-
sis of computability ￿in contrast to the usual emphasis on the philosophy and
methodology of recursion theory, especially in the applied sciences, whether
mathematical, natural, biological, social, humanistic or even, self-referentially,
in computer science itself. The great physicist, who combined a profound knowl-
edge of the theoretical underpinnings of experimental physics and the mathe-
matical basis of quantum mechanics, went on to embellish the above fruitful
characterisation of computability with the important distinction between know-
ing and proving14 (ibid, p.90; italics added):
￿The principle here is that you can know a lot more than you can
prove! Unfortunately, it is also possible to think you know a lot
more than you actually know. Hence the frequent need for proof.￿
This epistemic de￿cit, as one may call the gap between knowing something
and proving its truth, even before investigating the methods of knowing and the
means of proving, can be given a meaningful underpinning in terms of Michael
Polanyi￿ s famous notion of Tacit Knowledge ([47], p.4, italics in the original),
especially when juxtaposed with Feynman￿ s above points :
￿I shall reconsider human knowledge by starting from the fact that
we can know more than we can tell.￿
To this Polanyi adds the important caveat (ibid, p.7; italics added):
￿We have here examples of knowing, both of a more intellectual and
more practical kind; both the ￿ wissen￿and ￿ k￿nnen￿of the Germans,
or the ￿ knowing what￿and the ￿ knowing how￿of Gilbert Ryle. These
two aspects of knowing have a similar structure and neither is ever
present without the other.￿
The other side of this coin, from an economic and economist￿ s point of view,
is the current practice in mathematical economics and game theory, of ￿ prov-
ing￿non-constructively the existence of a provably uncomputable equilibrium,
￿rst; then, at a second, entirely di⁄erent stage, attempts are made to devise
algorithms to locate the equilibrium. All of every variant of computable general
equilibrium theory, algorithmic game theory and stochastic dynamic general
equilibrium methods in macroeconomics, are completely schizophrenic in this
sense.
14Ultimately, in Metamathematics, between truth and provability, ￿or between knowing a
proposition is true and being able to prove, formally, its truth ￿due mainly to the work of
G￿del, Church and Turing (and Skolem). Epistemology ￿or, at least, epistemics ￿enters at
the ground ￿oor in the computability aspects of Metamathematics.
10We are, perhaps, now ready to ask a simple, but obvious, question: What is
a computation?15, in the same sense in which Kant asked: What is Man? ￿
and, then, proceeded to break it up into three sub-questions: What can I know?
What must I do? What may I hope?
Analogously, we can subdivide the question on computation into three parts:
What can be computed? What must be done (by what16, to compute)? What
can be expected (from a computation)?
In a sense there are simple, even simplistic, answers to these questions. A
computation is that which is implementable via a Turing Machine. But that
leads to further questions: are there other models of computation that are
richer in some sense - in the nature of the data analysable, in the kind of
processing speeds, in the class of computable functions, and so on. Mercifully,
the Church-Turing Thesis obviates the need for any such elaboration. Note,
this is a Thesis, not a Theorem. It came about as a result of trying to ￿nd a
formal encapsulation of the intuitive notion of e⁄ective calculability. What is
the di⁄erence between a Thesis and a Theorem? Perhaps one illuminating way
to try to answer this question is to re￿ ect on ￿ an imaginary interview between
a modern mathematician [Professor X] and ... Descartes￿ , devised by Rosser
([55], pp. 2-3; italics added), trying to decide and de￿ne precisely the intuitive
notion of continuity in formal, mathematical, terms:
"Professor X decides to acquaint Descartes (with the modern
precise de￿nition of continuity) [" ￿ ￿ de￿nition] with the intention
of persuading him to adopt it in place of the vague intuitive idea of
tracing a curve without lifting the pencil from the paper. ....
.. Professor X found Descartes very agreeable to his suggestions
and quite willing to replace his vague idea of continuity by a precise
one. However, Descartes raised one di¢ culty which Professor X had
not foreseen. Descartes put it as follows:
￿ I have here an important concept which I shall call continuity.
At present my notion of it is rather vague, not su¢ ciently vague that
I cannot decide which curves are continuous, but too vague to permit
of careful proofs. You are proposing a precise de￿nition of this same
notion. However, since my de￿nition is too vague to be the basis for
a careful proof, how are we going to verify that my vague de￿nition
and your precise de￿nition are de￿nitions of the same thing.￿
If by ￿ verify￿Descartes meant ￿ prove￿ , it obviously could not be
done, since his de￿nition was too vague for proof. If by ￿ verify￿
Descartes meant ￿ decide,￿then it might be done, since his de￿nition
15A discussion of this question can be found in the elegantly pedagogical essay by one of
the great masters of computability theory in the post-Turing era: Martin Davis ([10]).
16By an abacus? By a slide rule? By a machine of the kind built by Babbage? By an
analogue machine of the di⁄erential analyser type? By a servomechanism? By a human
computor? By the brain? One of the most important results, against the backdrop of the
Church-Turing Thesis ￿about which I will have more to say, below ￿of computability theory,
is that whatever can be e⁄ectively calculated by any of these devices, can also be e⁄ected by
a Turing Machine.
11was not too vague for purposes of coming to decision. Actually,
Descartes and Professor X did ￿nally decide that the two de￿nitions
were equivalent .. ."
How did they come to this conclusion? By comparing the classi￿cations into
continuous and discontinuous all those ￿ interesting curves￿either of them could
￿ think of￿ , using their own respective de￿nitions ￿ the intuitive and the (so-
called) precise ￿and ￿nding they resulted in identical characterisations. Thus,
￿ the evidence seemed "conclusive" that the two de￿nitions were equivalent￿(ibid,
p.3).
However, even today we are aware that there are ￿ clear intuitive notions of
continuity which cannot be [topologically i.e., using, for example the ￿ precise￿ ,
" ￿ ￿ de￿nition] de￿ned￿ . (cf.[17], p.73).
Any and every computation that is implementable by a Turing Machine
answers all such questions of the ￿ equivalence￿between ￿ intuitive￿notions of
￿ e⁄ective calculability￿and formal de￿nitions of computability unambiguously:
every model of computation thus far formally de￿ned ￿Turing Machines [70],
Post￿ s Machine, Church￿ s ￿￿Calculus, General Recursiveness, the Shepherdson-
Sturgis Register machines [60] ￿is formally equivalent to any other. This is the
epistemological content 17 of the Church-Turing Thesis ([26], §62). As sum-
marised by the classic and original de￿nition of this concept by Kleene (op.cit,
pp. 300-1)18:
￿ Any general recursive function (predicate) is e⁄ectively calculable.
￿ Every e⁄ectively calculable function (e⁄ectively decidable predicate) is
general recursive.
￿ The ￿ Church[-Turing] Thesis￿is also implicit in the conception of a com-
puting machine formulated by Turing and Post.
And, Kleene went on (ibid, pp. 317-8; italics added):
17It is this that is stressed by G￿del when he ￿nally accepted the content of the Church-
Turing Thesis ([18], p.84; italics added):
"It seems to me that [the] importance [of Turing￿ s computability] is largely
due to the fact that with this concept one has for the ￿rst time succeeded in
giving an absolute de￿nition of an interesting epistemological notion, i.e., one
not depending on the formalism chosen."
18Apart from the classic discussion in [26], the most lucid exposition and the clearest case for
the intuitive (sic!) acceptance of the Church-Turing Thesis is, in my opinion, to be found in §
20 of R￿zsa PØter￿ s elegant book on Recursive Functions, [46]. A typical argument proceeded
as follows (ibid, p. 225; italics added):
"The assertion that the values of a function are everywhere calculable in a ￿nite
number of steps has meaning only under the condition that this calculation
does not depend on some individual arbitrariness, but constitutes a procedure
capable of being repeated and communicated to other people at any time. Hence
it must be a mechanical procedure, and thus one can imagine, in principle, a
machine able to carry through the single steps of the calculation."
12￿Since our original notion of e⁄ective calculability of a function
(or of e⁄ective decidability of a predicate) is a somewhat vague in-
tuitive one, the thesis cannot be proved.
The intuitive notion however is real, in that it vouchsafes as
e⁄ectively calculable many particular functions, .. and on the other
hand enables us to recognize that our knowledge about many other
functions is insu¢ cient to place them in the category of e⁄ectively
calculable functions.
Here, too, the epistemological role of a computation is explicitly recognised.
Yet19:
"Turing￿ s analysis divides, ...., into a conceptual analysis and
rigorous proof. The conceptual analysis leads ￿rst to a careful and
sharper formulation of the intended informal concept, here, ￿ me-
chanical procedures carried out by a human computor￿ , and second
to the axiomatic formulation of determinacy, boundedness, and lo-
cality conditions. Turing￿ s central thesis connects the informal no-
tion and the axiomatically restricted one. Rigorous proof allows us
then, third, to recognize that all the actions of an axiomatically re-
stricted computor can be stimulated by a Turing machine. Thus,
the analysis together with the proof allows us to ￿ replace￿the boldly
claimed thesis, all e⁄ectively calculable functions are Turing
computable, by a carefully articulated argument that includes a
sharpened informal notion and an axiomatically characterise one."
[62], p.173; italics in the original; bold emphasis, added.
Finally, the ￿ duality￿between e⁄ective calculability and e⁄ective undecidabil-
ity, made explicit by the Church-Turing Thesis is described with characteristic
and concise elegance by R￿zsa PØter ([46], p. 254; italics in the original):
"One of the most important applications of the [Church-Turing] the-
sis, making precise the concept of e⁄ectivitivity is the proof of the
e⁄ective undecidability of certain problems."
Mathematical economists and game theorists have never, to the best of my
knowledge, made either undecidability or unsolvability (see essay 2) core con-
cepts in their analytic framework. How could they? The orthodox mathematical
economic and game theoretic framework is not developed against the backdrop
of a model of computation; hence, the Church-Turing Thesis has no place in its
foundations. However, of course, ad hoc considerations of uncomputability does
19I should add that this lucid and detailed analysis of the rigorous nature of the Church-
Turing thesis also contains (ibid, § 6, pp. 173-176) an illuminating comparison of Dedekind￿ s
(successful, if measured by the standards of orthodox acceptance) de￿nition of continuity by
his ￿ construction￿of sections, to encapsulate the elusive intuitive notion, with Turing￿ s brilliant
three-part mode of deriving the equivalence between e⁄ective calculability and Turing Machine
computation.
13have a place in orthodox theory, albeit only in recent years. The closest to any-
thing like this that has become part of the fabric of mathematical economics is
Arrow￿ s Impossibility Theorem - but devoid of computability or constructivity
considerations (till very recently and, in general, in the sadly aborted research
program of Alain Lewis).
There remains, of course, the notion of computation intrinsic to constructive
mathematics, where there is no invoking of anything similar to a Church -
Turing Thesis. I will have to leave any discussion of this important issue for
another exercise. It means, of course, the answer to the question, ￿ What is a
computation￿ , may not be unambiguous!
5 A Concise Summary of the Evolution of the
Mathematical Theory of Economic Policy20
"[T]he story I am going to tell [is about] how macroeconomic
policy and research changed as the result of the transformation of
macroeconomics from constructing a system of equations of the na-
tional accounts to an investigation of dynamic stochastic economies.
Before the transformation what is evaluated is a policy action given
the current situation. .. After the transformation, what is evaluated
is a policy rule.. Before the transformation, optimal policy selection
was a matter of solving what the physical scientists called a control
problem. .. After the transformation ...the time inconsistency of
optimal plans necessitates following rules."
[49], pp.370, 372-4; italics added.
It may be useful to record the origins of this approach21. In the early 1930s,
the Social Democratic Minister of Finance of a Sweden grappling, like most other
economies, with the ravages wrought in the labour market by the ￿ great depres-
sion￿ , was Ernst Wigforss. He approached the two leading Swedish economists,
Gunnar Myrdal and Erik Lindahl, both sympathtic to the political philosophy
of the Social Democrats, and requested them to provide him with a ￿ theory
for the underbalancing of the budget￿so that he can justify the policy mea-
sures he was planning to implement to combat unemployment due to insu¢ cent
e⁄ective demand. He needed a ￿ theory￿ , he told them, because the leader of
the oppositon in that Parliament was the Professor of Economics at Stockholm
University, G￿sta Bagge, who was versed only in a theory that would justify a
balanced budget. Thus was born, via the framework devised in Myrdal￿ s famous
20This section is a drastically simpli￿ed and concise summary of the contents of my recent
invited lecture in honour of Geo⁄ Harcourt, delivered at the Cambridge Journal of Economics
conference, held on 25/26, June, 2011, at Robinson College, Cambridge. The full version will
be published in the Proceedigs of the Conference, to be published in the CJE, in 2012.
21It was narrated to me by Mrs Gertrud Lindahl, during personal conversations at her
home in Lund, in 1983. I was, then, working in the ￿ Lindahl archives￿ , which was nothing
more than her personally ordered, immaculately organised, collections of her late husband￿ s
rich contributions to economic theory and the theory of policy, among other things.
14memorandum to Wigforss ([35]), the classical theory22 of economic policy, made
mathematically formal, ￿rst, by Ragnar Frisch, Jan Tinbergen and Bent Hansen
and famously known as the ￿ target-instrument￿approach. It was built on the
essential back of the ￿ paradox of saving￿ , the main macroeconomic repository of
the wedge between ￿ wholes￿and ￿ parts￿that makes a mockery of reductionism.
If this was the origin23 ￿weaved into the fabric of, and underpinned by,
the works of their great master, Knut Wicksell, long before Keynesian theory
conquered all before it ￿its apotheosis was summarised in [45]24. In between
all and sundry had forgotten Lindahl￿ s wise re￿ ection:
"[T]he papers [on monetary policy] by Henry C. Simons and Mil-
ton Friedman, although intellectually interesting as attempts to solve
the insoluble problem of almost entirely substituting rules for author-
ities, do not give much guidance for the realization of this aim. Even
if one highly sympathizes with the idea that the monetary authori-
ties should be bound by certain rules ￿in the ￿rst place to maintain
a stable price level ￿one feels the problem must be taken up in a
more practical way.￿
[30], p. 507; italics added.
The elevation of ￿ rules￿to the status of a ￿ holy cow￿ , replacing ￿ ￿ne tuning￿ ,
was at the altar of the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics and,
hence, sancti￿ed by general equilibrium theory (as substantiated in the implicit
and explicit formalizations in the next section), which made them ￿￿ rules￿￿
intrinsically and naturally uncomputable and non-constructi￿able, making them
useless for actual policy implementations.
In the chronological order in which the mathematization of the theory of
policy proceeded could be schematised in the following six-part sequence:
￿ Targets-Instruments/Static-Dynamic
￿ Proportional/Derivative/Integral Stabilization Policies
￿ Optimal Policies
￿ Policy Ine⁄ectiveness/Credibility/Time Inconsistency
22By the ￿ classical theory of economic policy￿I am not referring to the theory of policy of
the classical economists.
23Which, even when circumscribed by the discipline of mathematical formalism, is not
entirely acceptable simply because, almost as always, Ramsey was there, before all this [51],
and had introduced the use of the calculus of variation. From this to the routine application
of optimal control theory and dynamic programming ￿whether in their stochastic, ￿ltering,
versions, or not ￿ in neoclassical growth models and the drivation of optimal ￿ rules￿was a
trivial step.
24The authors of this elegantly written book, written at the height of the faith in ￿ne-
tuning within a framework of optimal stochastic control, were blissfully unaware that they
were tolling a bell that rang hollow ￿in that the ￿ Lucasian revolution￿in policy nihilism was
already in full swing.
15￿ Ine¢ ciency of Policy in an Intertemporal (Overlapping) Equilibrium Model
￿Nonlinear Dynamics
￿ E¢ ciency of Policy Underpinned by the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare
Economics
The mathematical underpinnings were, in turn, provided by (at least): the
Calculus of Variations, Mathematical Programming, Ordinary Di⁄erential Equa-
tions (ODEs)/Dynamical Systems Theory, Controllability/Stabilizability, Opti-
mal Control Theory/Stochastic Optimal Control Theory, Dynamic Program-
ming, Markov Decision Processes, Kalman Filtering, Separating Hyperplane
Theorems/ Hahn-Banach Theorem and Fixed Point Theorems/Uzawa￿ s Equiv-
alence Theorem
The triptych of Dynamic Programming, Markov Decision Processes and
Kalman Filtering, as mathematical tools and framework, with which and within
which, to underpin newclassical macroeconomics, as Recursive25 Macroeconomics
was achieved with deceptive elegance by Sargent ([31]). In the next section it is
shown, formally, that the underpinning of policy in DSGE models, via reliance
on the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, using the last two sets of
mathematical tools ￿separating hyperplane theorems/ Hahn-Banach theorems
and ￿xed-point theorems/Uzawa equivalence theorem ￿is untenable from com-
putable and constructive mathematical points of view. It is equally feasible to do
the same for the other mathematical tools. For example, it is little understood
by those who routinely appeal to existence/uniqueness theorems for solutions
of ODEs ￿including, at the frontiers, to ￿ fashionable￿nonlinear dynamics of the
￿ chaotic￿variety ￿that, without exception, these theorems, even the classical
ones, are intrinsically uncomputable (almost always also non-constructive) and
appeal, indiscriminately to Zorn￿ s Lemma (or the Axiom of Choice). The para-
digmatic case is provided by any appeal to the Arzela-Ascoli theorem or one or
another of an ostensibly ￿ simple￿contraction mapping theorem (say, in dynamic
programming formalisations). Using the Arzela-Ascoli theorem in computing
approximations to the unique solution to an ODE, is exactly analogous to the
use of Sperner￿ s Lemma to construct a sequence of converging meshes to deter-
mine a Walrasian equilibrium by using, for example, Scarf￿ s algorithm (see the
next section). That I don￿ t attempt these exercises in this paper is only due to
the fact that their reliance on the fundamental theorems of welfare economics
is less decisive ￿as well as their underpinning in the DSGE methodology.
6 Six ￿ Impossible￿ Computable and Construc-
tive Claims in ADGE, CGE, RCE & ABE
Alice: There is no use trying; one can￿ t believe impossible things.
25This notion of ￿ recursive￿ has nothing whatsoever to do with formal recursion theory
(computability theory).
16White Queen: I dare say you haven￿ t had much practice. When I
was your age, I always did it for half an hour a day. Why, sometimes
I￿ ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.
Computable and constructive claims are routinely made by theorists and
policy oriented practitioners whose work forms the basis of one or another aspect
of an eventual DSGE model that ends up by being the foundation for serious
policy applications. I shall, in a slight variation of Lewis Carrol￿ s wisdom, take
up only ￿ six impossible things￿that are of relevance in the context of this paper.
Given that I have listed eight results in the Preamble, I could easily multiply
impossible examples quite liberally; but it will be su¢ cient to stick to this slight
variation in Lewis Carrol￿ s wisdom, at least for the limited purposes of the aims
of this paper.
6.1 The Nonconstructive Aspect of Brouwer￿ s Theorem
In Scarf￿ s classic book of 1973 there is the following characteristically careful
caveat to any unquali￿ed claims to constructivity of the algorithm he had de-
vised:
"In applying the algorithm it is, in general, impossible to select
an ever ￿ner sequence of grids and a convergent sequence of sub-
simplices. An algorithm for a digital computer must be basically
￿nite and cannot involve an in￿nite sequence of successive re￿ne-
ments. ....... The passage to the limit is the nonconstructive aspect
of Brouwer￿ s theorem, and we have no assurance that the subsimplex
determined by a ￿ne grid of vectors on S contains or is even close
to a true ￿xed point of the mapping."
[56], p.52; italics added
An algorithm, by de￿nition, is a ￿nite object, consisting of a ￿nite sequence
of instructions. However, such a ￿nite object is perfectly compatible with ￿ an
in￿nite sequence of successive re￿nements￿([56], p. 52), provided a stopping rule
associated with a clearly speci￿ed and veri￿able approximation value is part of
the sequence of instructions that characterize the algorithm. Moreover, it is not
￿ the passage to the limit [that] is the nonconstructive aspect of Brouwer￿ s [￿x
point] theorem￿(ibid, p.52)26. Instead, the sources of non-constructivity are
the undecidable disjunctions - i.e., appeal to the law of the excluded middle in
26In [57], p. 1024, Scarf is more precise about the reasons for the failure of constructivity
in the proof of Brouwer￿ s ￿x point theorem:
"In order to demonstrate Brouwer￿ s theorem completely we must consider a
sequence of subdivisions whose mesh tends to zero. Each such subdivision will
yield a completely labeled simplex and, as a consequence of the compactness of
the unit simplex, there is a convergent subsequence of completely labeled sim-
plices all of whose vertices tend to a single point x￿. (This is, of course, the
non-constructive step in demonstrating Brouwer￿ s theorem, rather than provid-
ing an approximate ￿xed point)."
17in￿nitary instances - intrinsic to the choice of a convergent subsequence in the
use of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem27 and an appeal to the law of double
negation in an in￿nitary instance during a retraction. The latter reliance inval-
idates the proof in the eyes of the Brouwerian constructivists; the former makes
it constructively invalid from the point of view of every school of constructivism,
whether they accept or deny intuitionistic logic.
Brouwer￿ s proof of his celebrated ￿x point theorem was indirect in two ways:
he proved, ￿rst, the following:
Theorem 1 Given a continuous map of the disk onto itself with no ￿xed points,
9 a continuous retraction of the disk to its boundary.
Having proved this, he then took its contrapositive:
Theorem 2 If there is no continuous retraction of the disk to its boundary then
there is no continuous map of the disk to itself without a ￿xed point.
Using the logical principle of equivalence between a proposition and its con-
trapositive (i.e., logical equivalence between theorems 1 & 2) and the law of
double negation (@ a continuous map with no ￿xed point = 9 a continuous map
with a ￿xed point) Brouwer demonstrated the existence of a ￿xed point for a
continuous map of the disk to itself. This latter principle is what makes the
proof of the Brouwer ￿x point theorem via retractions (or the non-retraction
theorem) essentially unconstructi￿able. Scarf￿ s attempt to discuss the relation-
ship between these two theorems [i.e., between the non-retraction and Brouwer
￿x point theorems] and to interpret [his] combinatorial lemma [on e⁄ectively
labelling a restricted simplex] as an example of the non-retraction theorem is
incongruous. This is because Scarf, too, like the Brouwer at the time of the origi-
nal proof of his ￿x-point theorem, uses the full paraphernalia of non-constructive
logical principles to link the Brouwer and non-retraction theorems and his com-
binatorial lemma28.
6.2 Scarf￿ s Fixed Point Algorithms are Nonconstructive
The economic foundations of CGE models lie in Uzawa￿ s Equivalence Theo-
rem ([72], [11], p.719, ⁄); the mathematical foundations are underpinned by
There are two points to be noted: ￿rst of all, even here Scarf does not pinpoint quite
precisely to the main culprit for the cause of the non-constructivity in the proof of Brouwer￿ s
theorem; secondly, nothing in the construction of the algorithm provides a justi￿cation to
call the value generated by it to be an approximation to x￿. In fact the value determined by
Scarf￿ s algorithm has no theoretically meaningful connection with x￿ (i.e., to p￿) for it to be
referred to as an approximate equilibrium.
27Just for ease of reading the discussion in this section I state, here, the simplest possible
statement of this theorem:
Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem: Every bounded sequence contains a con-
vergent subsequence
28Scarf uses, in addition, proof by contradiction where, implicitly, LEM (tertium non datur)
is also invoked in the context of an in￿nitary instance (cf. [57], pp. 1026-7).
18topological ￿x point theorems (Brouwer, Kakutani, etc.). The claim that such
models are computable or constructive rests on mathematical foundations of
an algorithmic nature: i.e., on recursion theory or some variety of constructive
mathematics. It is a widely held belief that CGE models are both constructive
and computable. That the latter property is held to be true of CGE models
is evident even from the generic name given to this class of models; that the
former characterization is a feature of such models is claimed in standard ex-
positions and applications of CGE models. For example in the well known,
and pedagogically elegant, textbook by two of the more prominent advocates
of applied CGE modelling in policy contexts, John Shoven and John Whalley
([61]), the following explicit claim is made:
"The major result of postwar mathematical general equilibrium the-
ory has been to demonstrate the existence of such an equilibrium by
showing the applicability of mathematical ￿xed point theorems to
economic models. ... Since applying general equilibrium models to
policy issues involves computing equilibria, these ￿xed point theo-
rems are important: It is essential to know that an equilibrium exists
for a given model before attempting to compute that equilibrium.
.....
...
The weakness of such applications is twofold. First, they provide
non-constructive rather than constructive proofs of the existence of
equilibrium; that is, they show that equilibria exist but do not pro-
vide techniques by which equilibria can actually be determined. Sec-
ond, existence per se has no policy signi￿cance. .... Thus, ￿xed point
theorems are only relevant in testing the logical consistency of mod-
els prior to the models￿use in comparative static policy analysis;
such theorems do not provide insights as to how economic behavior
will actually change when policies change. They can only be em-
ployed in this way if they can be made constructive (i.e., be used to
￿nd actual equilibria). The extension of the Brouwer and Kakutani
￿xed point theorems in this direction is what underlies the work of
Scarf .... on ￿xed point algorithms ...."
ibid, pp12, 20-1; italics added
Quite apart from a direct implication of the results of the previous sub-
section falsifying the above claims, they are also untenable because the Uzawa
Equivalence Theorem is provably undecidable. This is the topic of subsection
4.
6.3 Negishi￿ s Method is Non-Constructive
"The method of proof used in this essay [i.e., in [37]] has been found
useful also for such problems as equilibrium in in￿nite dimensional
space and computation of equilibria."
19[39], p. xiv; italics added.
What exactly was Negishi￿ s method of proof and how did it contribute to
the computation of equilibria?
A pithy characterisation of the di⁄erence between the standard approach to
proving the existence of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, and its computation by a
t￿tonnement procedure ￿i.e., algorithm ￿of a mapping from the price simplex
to itself, and the alternative Negishi method of iterating the weights assigned to
individual utility functions that go into the de￿nition of a social welfare function
which is maximised to determine ￿i.e., compute ￿the equilibrium, captures
the key innovative aspect of the latter approach. Essentially, therefore, the
di⁄erence between the standard approach to the proof of existence of equilibrium
Arrow-Debreu prices, and their computation, and the Negishi approach boils
down to the following:
￿ The standard approach proves the existence of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
prices by an appeal to a ￿xed point theorem and computes them ￿the
equilibrium prices ￿by invoking the Uzawa equivalence theorem ([72]) and
devising an algorithm for the excess demand functions that map a price
simplex into itself to determine the ￿xed point ([56]).
￿ The Negishi approach proves, given initial endowments, the existence of
individual welfare weights de￿ning a social welfare function, whose maxi-
mization (subject to the usual constraints) determines the identical Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium. The standard mapping of excess demand functions,
mapping a price simplex into itself to determine a ￿xed point, is replaced
by a mapping from the space of utility weights into itself, appealing to the
same kind of ￿xed point theorem (in this case, the Kakutani ￿xed point
theorem) to prove the existence of equilibrium prices.
￿ In other words, the method of proof of existence of equilibrium prices
in the one approach is replaced by the proof of existence of ￿ equilibrium
utility weights￿ , both appealing to traditional ￿xed point theorems ([4],
[82], and [25]29).
￿ In both cases, the computation of equilibrium prices on the one hand
and, on the other, the computation of equilibrium weights, algorithms are
devised that are claimed to determine (even if only approximately) the
same ￿xed points.
Before proceeding any further, I should add that I am in the happy position
of being able to refer the interested reader to a scholarly survey of Negishi￿ s
work. Takashi Negishi￿ s outstanding ￿ contributions to economic analysis￿are
brilliantly and comprehensively surveyed by Warren Young in his recent paper
29There is a curious ￿albeit inessential ￿￿ typo￿in Negishi￿ s reference to Kakutani￿ s classic
as having been published in 1948. The ￿ typo￿is not ￿ corrected￿even in the reprinted version
of [37] in [39].
20([87]). Young￿ s paper provides a particularly appropriate background to the
issues I tackle here. It ￿Young￿ s paper ￿is especially relevant also because his
elegant summary of Negishi￿ s ￿ contribution to economic analysis￿identi￿es [37]
as one of the two crucial pillars30 on which to tell a coherent and persuasive
story of what he calls the Negishi ￿ research program￿(ibid, p. 162; second set
of italics, added):
"To sum up, a number of major research programs can be identi-
￿ed, therefore, as emanating from Negishi￿ s now classic papers, that
of (1960) [37] and 1961 [38], respectively. Negishi￿ s 1960 paper forms
the basis for both ￿ theoretical￿and ￿ applied￿research programs in
general equilibrium analysis, and his 1961 paper ... has been almost
as in￿uential in demarcating ongoing research up to the present in
the ￿eld of imperfect competition and non-tatonnement processes.
These papers ... attest to Negishi￿ s considerable in￿ uence on the
development of modern economic theory and analysis."
However, no one ￿ to the best of my knowledge ￿ has studied Negishi￿ s
method of proof from the point of view of constructivity and computability.
Young￿ s perceptive - and, in my opinion, entirely correct - identi￿cation of
the crucial role played by Negishi (1960) in ￿ both "theoretical" and "applied"
research program in general equilibrium analysis￿is, in fact, about methods of
existence proofs and computable general equilibrium (CGE), and its o⁄shoots,
in the form of applied computable general equilibrium analysis ACGE) ￿even
leading up to current frontiers in computational issues in DSGE models (cf.,
[24], pp. 52-57, for example).
Before I turn to these issues of the constructivity and computability of
Negishi￿ s method of existence proofs and the underpinning of some aspects
computation in CGE and ACGE models in Negishi￿ s approach (rather than, for
example, in the standard approach pioneered by [56]), there is one important
economic theoretic confusion that needs to be sorted out. This is the question of
the role played by the fundamental theorems of welfare economics in Negishi￿ s
method of the proof of the existence of a general (Walrasian) equilibrium.
It is generally agreed that the Negishi method of existence proof is an applica-
tions of ￿xed point theorems on the utility simplex, in contrast to the ￿ standard￿
way of applying such theorems to the price simplex (cf., [7], p. 138, and above).
This fact has generated a remarkable confusion on the question of which fun-
damental theorem of welfare economics underpins the Negishi method! For a
method that has been around for over half a century, it is somewhat disheart-
ening to note that frontier research and researchers seem still to be confused
on which of the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics is relevant in
Negishi￿ s method. Thus, we ￿nd Judd, as recently as only a few years ago
(op.cit, pp. 52-3) claiming, unreservedly, that (italics added):
30The other one being [38]. I am in full agreement with Young￿ s important observation that
it is [37] that is more important, which is why I have added italics to the phrase ￿ almost as
in￿uential￿ , in the above quote.
21"The Negishi method exploits the ￿rst theorem of welfare economics,
which states that any competitive equilibrium of an Arrow-Debreu
model is Pareto e¢ cient."
On the other hand, Warren Young (op.cit, p.152; italics added) equally
con￿dentially stating that:
In his pioneering 1960 paper, Negishi provided a completely new
way of proving the existence of equilibrium, via the Second Welfare
Theorem. He established equivalence between the equilibrium prob-
lem set out by Arrow-Debreu and what has been called ￿ mathemati-
cal programming￿ , thereby developing a ￿ method￿that has been used
with much success by later economists working in both theoretical
and applied general equilibrium modelling ... ."
Fortunately, Negishi himself returned to a discussion of the ￿ Negishi method,
or Negishi approach￿more recently ([40], p. 168) and may have helped sort out
this conundrum (ibid, p. 167; italics added):
"The so-called Negishi method, or Negishi approach, has often
been used in studies of dynamic in￿nite-dimensional general equi-
librium theory, and the numerical computation of such equilibria
... . This method is an application of the Negishi theorem ([37]),
which demonstrates the existence of a general equilibrium using the
￿rst theorem of welfare economics, which states that any competitive
equilibrium of an Arrow-Debreu model is Pareto e¢ cient. In other
words, a general equilibrium of a competitive economy is considered
as the maximization of a kind of social welfare function (i.e., the
properly weighted sum of individual utilities), where the weights are
inversely proportional to the marginal utility of income."
Negishi is one of those rare economists who is both a scholar of the history
of economic theory and one of the most competent general equilibrium theorists
and ￿even if he had not been the originator of the Negishi method ￿therefore
one may feel forced to reject Warren Young￿ s claim31!
As a matter of fact, from my Computable Economics ￿i.e., from a construc-
tivist and recursion theoretic - point of view, this conundrum is a non-problem
for several reasons. First of all, both fundamental theorems of welfare economics
are proved non-constructively and lead to uncomputable equilibria (see below).
Secondly, all ￿to the best of my knowledge ￿of the current algorithms utilised
in CGE, ACGE and DSGE modelling appeal to undecidable disjunctions and
31The puzzle here is that the Young and Negishi articles appear ￿ back-to-back￿ , in the same
issue of the International Journal of Economic Theory and the two distinguished authors
thank each other handsomely in their respective acknowledgements! Just for the record, my
own view is the following. My strong conviction is that Negishi￿ s theorem provides the ￿ only
if ￿part of the ￿rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics.
22are e⁄ectively meaningless from a computablity point of view. Thirdly, and
most importantly, Negishi￿ s theorem32 is, itself, proved nonconstructively.
There are two theorems in [37]. I shall concentrate on Theorem 2 (ibid, p.5),
which (I think) is the more important one and the one that came to play the
important role justly attributed to it via the Negishi Research Program outlined
by Young (op.cit)33.
Proposition 3 The Proof of the Existence of Maximising Welfare Weights in
the Negishi Theorem is Nonconstructive
Remark 4 Negishi￿ s proof relies on satisfying the Slater (Complementary) Slack-
ness Conditions ([64]34). Slater￿ s proof35 of these conditions invoke the Kaku-
tani ￿xed point theorem (Theorem 1 in [25]), and Kakutani￿ s Min-Max Theo-
rem (Theorem 3, ibid). These two theorems, in turn, invoke Theorem 2 and
the Corollary (ibid, p.458), which are based on Theorem 1 (ibid, p. 457). This
latter theorem is itself based on the validity of the Brouwer ￿xed point theorem,
which is Non-constructi￿able (cf., [5]).
Proposition 5 The vector of maximising welfare weights, derived in the Negishi
Theorem, is uncomputable
Remark 6 A straightforward implication of Claim 1
Discovering the exact nature and source of appeals to nonconstructive modes
of reasoning, appeals to undecidable disjunctions and reliance on nonconstruc-
tive mathematical entities in the formulation of a theorem is a tortuous exercise.
The nature of the pervasive presence of these three elements ￿i.e., nonconstruc-
tive modes of reasoning, primarily the reliance on tertium non datur, undecid-
able disjunctions and nonconstructive mathematical entities ￿in any standard
theorem and its proof, and the di¢ culties of discovering them, is elegantly out-
lined by Fred Richman ([53], p. 125; italics added):
￿Even those who like algorithms have remarkably little appreci-
ation of the thoroughgoing algorithmic thinking that is required for
32Negishi￿ s theorem is one thing; Negishi￿ s method is quite a di⁄erent thing. The latter
should refer to the ￿ method of proof￿ , but the vast literature on the issue ￿admirably doc-
umented in [87] ￿ is not free of confusion on this point. Essentially, the ￿ method￿refers to
the fact that a mapping is de￿ned, not on the price simplex, but on the ￿ utility simplex￿(see,
again, [7]).
33To demonstrate the nonconstructive elements of Theorem 1 (ibid, p.5), I would need to
include almost a tutorial on constructive mathematics to make clear the notion of compactness
that is legitimate in constructive analysis. For reasons of ￿ readability￿and ￿ deeper￿reasons of
aesthetics and mathematical philosophy, I shall refer to my two main results as ￿ Propositions￿
and their plausible validity as ￿ Remarks￿ , and not as ￿ Theorems￿and ￿ proofs￿ , respectively.
34This classic by Slater must easily qualify for inclusion in the class of pioneering articles
that remained forever in the ￿ samizdat￿ status of a Discussion Paper!
35I should add that the applied general equilibrium theorists who use Negishi￿ s method to
￿ compute￿(uncomputable) equilibria do not seem to be fully aware of the implications of some
of the key assumptions in Slater￿ s complementary slackness conditions. That Negishi ([37]) is
aware of them is clear from his Assumption 2 and Lemma 1.
23a constructive proof. This is illustrated by the nonconstructive na-
ture of many proofs in books on numerical analysis, the theoretical
study of practical numerical algorithms. I would guess that most
realist mathematicians are unable even to recognize when a proof is
constructive in the intuitionist￿ s sense.
It is a lot harder than one might think to recognize when a the-
orem depends on a nonconstructive argument. One reason is that
proofs are rarely self-contained, but depend on other theorems whose
proofs depend on still other theorems. These other theorems have of-
ten been internalized to such an extent that we are not aware whether
or not nonconstructive arguments have been used, or must be used,
in their proofs. Another reason is that the law of excluded middle
[LEM] is so ingrained in our thinking that we do not distinguish
between di⁄erent formulations of a theorem that are trivially equiv-
alent given LEM, although one formulation may have a constructive
proof and the other not.￿
6.4 The Uzawa Equivalence Theorem
The Uzawa Equivalence theorem is the fulcrum around which the theory of
CGE modelling revolves. This key theorem36 provides the theoretical justi￿ca-
tion for relying on the use of the algorithms that have been devised for determin-
ing general economic equilibria as ￿x points using essentially non-constructive
topological arguments. The essential content of the theorem is the mathematical
equivalence between a precise statement of Walras￿Existence Theorem (WET)
and Brouwer￿ s (or any other relevant) Fix-Point Theorem. To study the al-
gorithmic - i.e., computable and constructive - content of the theorem, it is
necessary to analyse the assumptions underpinning WET, the nature of the
proof of economic equilibrium existence in WET and the nature of the proof
of equivalence. By the ￿ nature of the proof￿I mean, of course, the construc-
tive content in the logical procedures used in the demonstrations- whether, for
example, the law of double negation or the law of the excluded middle (LEM:
tertium non datur) is invoked in non-￿nitary instances. Therefore, I shall, ￿rst,
state an elementary version of WET (cf., [72], p. 60 or [65], p. 136).
Theorem 7 Walras￿Existence Theorem (WET)
Let the excess demand function, X(p) = [x1(p);:::::::;xn(p)], be a mapping
from the price simplex, S, to the RN
commodity space; i.e., X(p) : S ! RN
where:
i). X(p) is continuous for all prices, p 2 S
ii). X(p) is homogeneous of degree 0;
36To the best of my knowledge, none of the standard advanced textbooks in mathematical
economics, microeconomics or general equilibrium theory (Kreps, Varian, etc.), except the
two by Cornwall ([9]) and Starr ([65]), even refer to Uzawa￿ s theorem.
24iii). p:X(p) = 0;8p 2 S (Walras￿Law holds:
n X
i=1
pixi(p) = 0, 8p 2 S)37
Then:
9p￿ 2 S; s.t., X(p￿) ￿ 0, with p￿
i = 0; 8i, s.t., Xi(p￿) < 0
The ￿nesse in this half of the equivalence theorem, i.e., that WET implies
the Brouwer ￿x point theorem, is to show the feasibility of devising38 a contin-
uous excess demand function, X(p), satisfying Walras￿Law (and homogeneity),
from an arbitrary continuous function, say f(:) : S ! S, such that the equilib-
rium price vector implied by X(p) is also the ￿x point for f(:), from which it is
￿ constructed￿ . The key step in proceeding from a given, arbitrary, f(:) : S ! S
























) ￿ pi￿(p) (3)
i.e.,
X(p) = f(p) ￿ ￿(p)p (4)
It is simple to show that (3) [or (4)] satis￿es (i)-(iii) of Theorem 3 and,
hence, 9p￿ s.t., X(p￿) ￿ 0 (with equality unless p￿ = 0). Elementary (non-
constructive) logic and economics then imply that f(p￿) = p￿. I claim that the
procedure that leads to the de￿nition of (3) [or, equivalently, (4)] to determine
p￿is provably undecidable. In other words, the crucial scalar in (1) cannot be
de￿ned recursion theoretically (and, a fortiori, constructively) to e⁄ectivize a
sequence of projections that would ensure convergence to the equilibrium price
vector.
37As far as possible I attempt to retain ￿delity to Uzawa￿ s original notation and structure
even although more general formulations are possible. .
38I have to seek recourse to words such as ￿ devise￿to avoid the illegitimate use of mathe-
matically loaded terms like ￿ construction￿ , ￿ choice￿ , ￿ choose￿ , etc., that the literature on CGE
modelling is replete with, signifying, illegitimately, possibilities of meaningful - i.e., algorith-
mic - ￿ construction￿ , ￿ choice￿ , etc. For example, Uzawa, at this point, states: "We construct
an excess demand function.." (op.cit, p.61; italics added;). Starr, at a comparable stage of the
proof states: "If we have constructed [the excess demand function] cleverly enough..." (op.cit.,
p.137; italics added). Neither of these claims are valid from the point of view of any kind of
algorithmic procedure.
25Theorem 8 X(p￿), as de￿ned in (3) [or (4)] above is undecidable; i.e., cannot
be determined algorithmically.
Proof. Suppose, contrariwise, there is an algorithm which, given an arbitrary
f(:) : S ! S, determines X(p￿). This means, therefore, in view of (i)-(iii)
of Theorem 1, that the given algorithm determines the equilibrium p￿ implied
by WET. In other words, given the arbitrary initial conditions p 2 S and
f(:) : S ! S, the assumption of the existence of an algorithm to determine
X(p￿) implies that its halting con￿gurations are decidable. But this violates the
undecidability of the Halting Problem for Turing Machines. Hence, the assump-
tion that there exists an algorithm to determine - i.e., to construct - X(p￿) is
untenable.
Remark 9 The algorithmically important content of the proof is the following.
Starting with an arbitrary continuous function mapping the simplex into itself
and an arbitrary price vector, the existence of an algorithm to determine X(p￿)
entails the feasibility of a procedure to choose price sequences in some deter-
mined way to check for p￿ and to halt when such a price vector is found. Now,
the two scalars, ￿ and ￿ are determined once f(:) and p are given. But an ar-
bitrary initial price vector p, except for ￿ukes, will not be the equilibrium price
vector p￿. Therefore the existence of an algorithm would imply that there is a
systematic procedure to choose price vectors, determine the values of f(:), ￿ and
￿ and the associated excess demand vector X(p;￿;￿). At each determination
of such an excess demand vector, a projection of the given, arbitrary, f(p), on
the current X(p), for the current p, will have to be tried. This procedure must
continue till the projection for a price vector results in excess demands that
vanish for some price. Unless severe recursive constraints are imposed on price
sequences - constraints that will make very little economic sense - such a test is
algorithmically infeasible. In other words, given an arbitrary, continuous, f(:),
there is no procedure - algorithm (constructive or recursion theoretic) - by which
a sequence of price vectors, p 2 S, can be systematically tested to ￿nd p￿.
Remark 10 In the previous remark, as in the discussion before stating Theorem
4, I have assumed away the di¢ culties with uncomputable functions, prices and
so on. They simply add to complications without changing the nature of the
content of Theorem 4.
6.5 From CGE to RCE
The undisputed pioneers of RBC theory, Kydland and Prescott, appear to claim
that the path towards RCE, and hence the benchmark for DSGE, begins with
ADGE, and ￿ was greatly advanced by Shoven and Whalley, who built on the
work of Scarf￿ , [29], p.168. However, go on Kydland and Prescott:
"Their approach is ill-suited for the general equilibrium mod-
elling of business ￿ uctuations because dynamics and uncertainty are
26crucial to any model that attempts to study business cycles. To ap-
ply general equilibrium methods to the quantitative study of busi-
ness cycle ￿ uctuations, we need methods to compute the equilibrium
processes of dynamic stochastic economies, and speci￿c methods for
the stochastic growth model economy. Recursive competitive theory
and the use of linear-quadratic economies39 are methods that have
proven particularly useful. These tools make it possible to com-
pute the equilibrium stochastic processes of a rich class of model
economies."
ibid., p. 169
The power this particular dynamic extension of the traditional equilibrium
concept plays a signi￿cant role in the mathematized macroeconomy is further
described, four years later, by Cooley and Prescott:
"Another great advantage of the RCE approach is that for an
increasingly rich class of model economies, the equilibrium process
can be computed and can be simulated to generate equilibrium paths
for the economy. These paths can be studied to see whether model
economies mimic the behavior of actual economies and can be used
to provide quantitative answers to questions of economic welfare."
[8], p.9; italics added.
Now, there are three problems with these claims and aims. First of all, and
trivially, nowhere in the literature on mathematical economics, mathematical
macroeconomics or even in formal computability theory is there any proposi-
tion on the e¢ ciency of processes; in fact, it is quite easy to show that the
dynamic programming formulation for the RCE is, in fact computationally in-
tractable in a precise sense. Secondly, neither the ￿rst nor the second welfare
theorems are computationally feasible in the precise senses of computability
theory and constructive analysis. Thirdly, the approximation procedures used,
in computing the relevant RCE are provably intractable, simply because the
equilibrium is uncomputable!
I shall only deal with the second of these infelicities in this paper. Companion
pieces to this work tackle the whole set of issues more systematically.
The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics asserts that
a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. A textbook formulation of the
theorem is as follows ([65], p. 145):
Theorem 11 Assume Weak monotonicity and continuity of preferences; Let
p￿ 2 <N
+ be a competitive equilibrium price vector of the economy. Let !0i,
i 2 H, be associated individual consumption bundles, and let y0j, j 2 F;be the
associated ￿rm supply vectors. Then !0i is Pareto e¢ cient.
39It is not too much of an exaggeration to observe that the assumption of ￿ linear-quadratic
economies￿is as prevalent and as mendacious as the assumption of an aggregate production
function of a Cobb-Douglas form; neither are approximation to what they claim to represent.
27where:
F : set of ￿rms.
Proof. See [65], p. 145-6.
Remark 12 The theorem is proved non-constructively, using an uncomputable
equilibrium price vector to compute an equilibrium allocation. Therefore, the
contradiction step in the proof requires a comparison between an uncomputable
allocation and an arbitrary allocation, for which no computable allocation can
be devised. Moreover, the theorem assumes the intermediate value theorem in
its non-constructive form. Finally, even if the equilibrium price vector is com-
putable, the contradiction step in the proof invokes the law of the excluded middle
and is, therefore, unacceptable constructively (because it requires algorithmically
undecidable disjunctions to be employed in the decision procedure).
The Second Fundamental Welfare Theorem establishes the proposition that
any Pareto optimum can, for suitably chosen prices, be supported as a competi-
tive equilibrium. The role of the Hahn-Banach theorem in this proposition is in
establishing the suitable price system.
Lucas and Stokey state ￿ their￿version of the Hahn-Banach Theorem in the
following way40.
Theorem 13 Geometric form of the Hahn-Banch Theorem.
Let S be a normed vector space; let A;B ￿ S be convex sets. Assume:
(a). Either B has an interior point and A \ ￿ B = ;,
￿
￿ B : closure of B
￿
;
(b). Or, S is ￿nite dimensional and A \ B = ;;
Then: 9 a continuous linear functional ￿, not identically zero on S; and a
constant c s.t:
￿(y) ￿ c ￿ ￿(x); 8x 2 A and 8y 2 B:
Next, I state the economic part of the problem in merciless telegraphic form
as follows:
There are I consumers, indexed i = 1;::::;I;
S is a vector space with the usual norm;
Consumer i chooses from commodity set Xi ￿ S, evaluated according to the
utility function ui : Xi ! <;
There are j ￿rms, indexed j = 1;::::;J;
Choice by ￿rm j is from the technology possibility set, Yj ￿ S; (evaluated
along pro￿t maximizing lines);
40Essentially, the ￿ classical￿mathematician￿ s Hahn-Banach theorem guarantees the exten-
sion of a bounded linear functional, say ￿, from a linear subset Y of a separable normed linear
space, X, to a functional, ￿; on the whole space X, with exact preservation of norm; i.e.,
j￿j = j￿j. The constructive Hahn-Banach theorem, on the other hand, cannot deliver this
pseudo-exactness and preserves the extension as: j￿j ￿ j￿j+", 8" > 0: The role of the positive
" in the constructive version of the Hahn-Banach theorem is elegantly discussed by Nerode,
Metakides and Constable in their beautiful piece in the Bishop Memorial Volume ([41], pp.
85-91). Again, compare the di⁄erence between the ￿ classical￿IVT and the constructive IVT
to get a feel for the role of ":
28The mathematical structure is represented by the following absolutely stan-
dard assumptions:
1. 8i;Xi is convex;
2. 8i; if x;x0 2 Ci;ui(x) > ui(x0); and if ￿ 2 (0;1); then ui [￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)x0] >
ui(x0);
3. 8i;ui : Xi ! < is continuous;
4. The set Y =
P
j Yj is convex;
5. Either the set Y =
P
j Yj has an interior point, or S is ￿nite dimensional;
Then, the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics is:











Optimal allocation; assume, for some h 2
￿￿ 1;:::::￿ I
￿
;9^ xh 2 Xh with uh(^ xh) >
uh(x0
h): Then 9 a continuous linear functional ￿ : S ! <; not identically zero
on S, s.t:
(a). 8i;x 2 Xi and ui(x) ￿ ui(x0) =) ￿(x) ￿ ￿(x0
i);
(b). 8j;y 2 Yj =) ￿(j) ￿ ￿(y0
i );
It is a pure mechanical procedure to verify that the assumptions of the
economic problem satisfy the conditions of the Hahn-Banach Theorem and,
therefore, the powerful Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics is
￿ proved￿ 41.
The Hahn-Banach theorem does have a constructive version, but only on
subspaces of separable normed spaces. The standard, ￿ classical￿version, valid
on nonseparable normed spaces depends on Zorn￿ s Lemma which is, of course,
equivalent to the axiom of choice, and is therefore, non-constructive42.
Schechter￿ s perceptive comment on the constructive Hahn-Banach theorem is
the precept I wish economists with a numerical, computational or experimental
bent should keep in mind (ibid, p. 135).:
"[O]ne of the fundamental theorems of classical functional analysis
is the Hahn-Banach Theorem; ... some versions assert the existence
of a certain type of linear functional on a normed space X. The
theorem is inherently nonconstructive, but a constructive proof can
be given for a variant involving normed spaces X that are separable
41To the best of my knowledge an equivalence between the two, analogous to that between
the Brouwer ￿x point theorem and the Walrasian equilibrium existence theorem, proved by
Uzawa ([72]), has not been shown.
42This is not a strictly accurate statement, although this is the way many advanced books
on functional analysis tend to present the Hahn-Banach theorem. For a reasonably accessible
discussion of the precise dependency of the Hahn-Banach theorem on the kind of axiom of
choice (i.e., whether countable axiom of choice or the axiom of dependent choice), see [36].
For an even better and fuller discussion of the Hahn-Banach theorem, both from ￿ classical￿
and a constructive points of view, Schechter￿ s encyclopedic treatise is unbeatable ([58]).
29￿i.e., normed spaces that have a countable dense subset. Little is
lost in restricting one￿ s attention to separable spaces43, for in applied
math most or all normed spaces of interest are separable. The con-
structive version of the Hahn-Banach Theorem is more complicated,
but it has the advantage that it actually ￿nds the linear functional
in question."
So, one may be excused for wondering, why economists rely on the ￿ classical￿
versions of these theorems? They are devoid of numerical meaning and compu-
tational content. Why go through the rigmarole of ￿rst formalizing in terms of
numerically meaningless and computationally invalid concepts to then seek im-
possible and intractable approximations to determine uncomputable equilibria,
undecidably e¢ cient allocations, and so on?
Thus my question is: why should an economist force the economic domain
to be a normed vector space? Why not a separable normed vector space? Isn￿ t
this because of pure ignorance of constructive mathematics and a carelessness
about the nature and scope of fundamental economic entities and the domain
over which they should be de￿ned?
On the other hand, the ￿rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics fails
constructively and computably on three grounds: the dependence on the in-
termediate value theorem (non-constructive), the use of an uncomputable equi-
libirum price vector in the proof by contradiction (uncomputability) and the
use of the law of the excluded middle in the proof by contradiction (non-
constructivity).
Under these conditions, the equilibrium of the canonical SDGE model, RCE,
cannot, in any formal algorithmic sense be e⁄ectively or constructively com-
puted; therefore, no equilibrium process can e⁄ectively be determined to show
convergence to a balanced growth path.
Finally, the mathematical structure of the space on which the value function
and the policy function are de￿ned is such that the existence of a ￿x point for
the contraction operator that is invoked is non-algorithmizable. This is because
Cauchy Completeness is assumed for the space over which the contraction is
implemented. Cauchy Completeness, can be stated as:
Theorem 15 Every Cauchy sequence in R converges to an element of R
This theorem is, in turn, proved using the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem,
which contains an unconstructi￿able - i.e., non-algorithmic and hence impossible
to utilise in a consistent ￿ computational experiment￿- undecidable disjunction
in its proof!
In other words, the computational program of mathematizing macroeco-
nomics by formulating optimal decision problems as dynamic programming
problems is impossible.
43However, it must be remembered that Ishihara, [23], has shown the constructive validity
of the Hahn-Banach theorem also for uniformly convex spaces.
306.6 Agent-based computational methods and adaptive dy-
namics
The origins of what has become agent-based computational methods can be
traced to the pioneering works of Turing on Morphogenesis [71], von Neumann
on The Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata ([83]), and Ulam on Nonlinear
dynamics ([15], [66]). A ￿ second generation￿of pioneers were Conway ([3]) and
Wolfram [85]), the former directly in the von Neumann tradition and the latter
straddling the von Neumann and Ulam traditions ￿i.e., working on the interface
between cellular automata modelling and dynamical system interpretation of the
transition equations.
Remarkably, there was an independent tradition in economics, pioneered
by Richard Goodwin ([19]), in his computational studies of coupled markets,
which directly inspired Herbert Simon￿ s approach to the computational study
of evolutionary dynamics in terms of semi-decomposable linear systems ([63]).
Sadly, none of these classics have had the slightest impact on the current
frontiers of agent-based computational economics (see, for example, [69]). Had
any awareness of the classics, their frameworks, the questions they posed, the
tentative answers they obtained, the research directions they suggested had been
absorbed, even in some rudimentary way, many of the exaggerated claims and
assertions of the advocates of agent based computable economics would have
been less absurd, more measured and, surely, also humbler in the expectations
of what this line of computational research could and must achieve. An example
of the utterly untenable claim of a senior advocate of agent based computational
economics may convey our sadness of the lack of anchoring in the classics more
vividly. In his chapter, titled Agent-Based Macro ([69], p. 1626; italics added),
Axel Leijonhufvud asserts that:
"Agent-based computational methods provide the only way in which
the self-regulatory capabilities of complex dynamic models can be ex-
plored so as to advance our understanding of the adaptive dynamics
of actual economies."
Quite apart from the many unde￿ned ￿even formally unde￿nable unam-
biguously ￿concepts in this remarkably unscholarly statement, the extraordi-
nary claim that ￿ agent-based computational methods provide the only way￿ to
understand anything, let alone of the ￿ adaptive dynamics of actual economies￿ ,
must make the scienti￿c spirit of Goodwin and Simon writhe in intellectual pain
￿not to mention the noble ghosts of Ulam, von Neumann and Turing.
What are ￿ agent-based computational methods￿? Do they transcend Turing
Machine computation? If so, how ￿and why? How does one link a computa-
tionally implemented method with a complex dynamical system, even assuming
that it is possible to de￿ne such a thing unambiguously and consistent with the
dynamics of a computation?
On the other hand, agent based computable economic practice is closely
tied to the belief that such models are capable of generating so-called ￿ emergent
31phenomena￿ , in the sense that their existence cannot be predicted from the un-
derpinning laws of individual agent interactions. Very little scholarship on the
rich tradition of philosophical, epistemological, computational and dynamic re-
search ￿with a solid contribution to the epistemology of simulation (cf. [84]) ￿on
￿ emergence￿is manifested in the frontier research by agent based computational
economists (a paradigmatic example of in￿ ated claims and de￿cient scholarship
on agent-based computational modelling, the tortuous concept of ￿ reductionism￿
and the possibility of so-called ￿ emergent aggregative phenomena￿can be found
in [13]).
No better characterisation of the practice of agent-based computational
economists can be given that the one Arthur Burks gave (cf. [6], p. xviii),
on a related ￿ procedure for investigating cellular spaces￿ :
"The investigator starts with a certain global behavior and wants
to ￿nd a transition function for a cellular automaton which exhibits
that behaviour. He then chooses as subgoals certain elementary
behavioral functions and proceeds to de￿ne his transition function
piece-meal so as to obtain these behaviors.
.....
The task of searching for a transition function which produces
a speci￿ed behavior is an arduous task because there are so many
possible partial transition functions to explore."
The formal di¢ culties of ￿ searching for a transition function￿are provably
intractable, at best; algorithmically undecidable, in general. Even when found,
depending on the way the data generating process if characterised, whether
the transition function ￿when viewed as a ￿nite automaton ￿￿ halts￿at the
prescribed state is, again, in general, algorithmically undecidable, Correspond-
ingly, when viewed as a dynamical system, whether the global behaviour is an
attractor or is in a particular basin of attraction of the dynamical system, is al-
gorithmicall undecidable. Whether a set of initial conditions, for the transition
function, can be algorithmically determined such that their halting state is the
desired global behaviour, or such that the global behaviour is in the basin of
attraction of the transition function as a dynamical system is decidable only for
trivial sets.
Suppose we succeed in ￿nding such a transition function ￿as many agent
based computational economists claim they can, and have ￿and want to char-
acterise it either in terms of computability theory or as a dynamical system.
Suppose, also, that we ask the questions the pioneers asked: the feasibility of
self-reproduction, self-reconstruction, evolution, computation universality, de-
cidability of limit sets of the transition function when interpreted as a dynam-
ical system, whether the transition function, viewed as an ￿nite automaton, is
subject to the Halting Problem, and so on. At the least, any reasonable notion
of ￿ emergence￿requires unambiguous answers to most of these questions ￿all of
which are, in general, subject to algorithmic undecidabilities.
327 Towards a Computable Approach to Economic
Modelling
"This is a lecture on music which is indeterminate with regard to
its performance. ..... . The Music of Changes is not an example. In
the Music of Changes, structure, which is the division of the whole into
parts; method, which is the note-to-note procedure; form, which is the
expressive content, the morphology of the continuity; and materials, the
sounds and silences of the composition, are all determined. Though no
two performances of the Music of Changes will be identical . . ., two per-
formances will resemble one another closely. Though chance operations
brought about the determination of the composition, these operations are
not available in its performance. . . . The Music of Changes is an
object more inhuman than human. . . .The fact that these things
that constitute it, though only sounds, have come together to con-
trol a human being, the performer, gives the work the alarming
quality of a Frankenstein monster. This situation is of course charac-
teristic of Western music, the masterpieces of which are its most
frightening examples, which when concerned with human
communication only move from Frankenstein monster to
Dictator.
John Cage: Indeterminacy; bold emphasis, added
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￿ Does nature compute?￿ , is a question natural scientists ask with increasing
frequency. The di⁄erential equations, or maps, that seem to characterise the
dynamical systems of nature are hardly ever analytically ￿ solvable￿ . Either we
must try to devise and evolve an epistemology to come to terms with ￿ unsolvabil-
ity￿and, therefore, accept a ￿ truth de￿cit￿￿that ￿ true￿solutions are inherently
unreachable ￿ or ￿nd other ways to represent nature￿ s processes. One such
alternative way is to interpret nature￿ s processes as computations. But compu-
tations, too, may not ￿ halt￿ . A master dynamical system theorist outlined the
dilemma cogently:
"We regard the computer as an ￿ oracle￿ which we ask ques-
tions. Questions are formulated as input data for sets of calculations.
There are two possible outcomes to the computer￿ s work: either the
calculations rigorously con￿rm that a phase portrait is correct, or
they fail to con￿rm it. .... The theory that we present states that if
one begins with a structurally stable vector ￿eld, there is input data
that will yield a proof that a numerically computed phase portrait
is correct. However, this fails to be completely conclusive from an
algorithmic point of view, because one has no way of verifying that
a vector ￿eld is structurally stable in advance of a positive outcome.
Thus, if one runs a set of trials of increasing precision, the computer
44Lecture on Indeterminacy, p. 31, in: Silence (Wesleyan University Press, Middletown,
CT, 1961).
33will eventually produce a proof of correctness of a phase portrait for
a structurally stable vector ￿eld. Presented with a vector ￿eld that
is not structurally stable, the computer will not con￿rm this fact:; it
will only fail in its attempted proof of structural stability45. Prag-
matically, we terminate the calculation when the computer produces
a de￿nitive answer or our patience is exhausted. ....
The situation described in the previous paragraph is analogous
to the question of producing a numerical proof that a continuous
function has a zero. ..... Numerical proofs that a function vanishes
can be expected to succeed only when the function has qualitative
properties that can be veri￿ed with ￿nite-precision calculations."
[20], pp.154-5, italics added.
What, then, if the economy is itself a computer? Do economic processes,
whether aggregative or not, embody the results of a computation? Do we,
as economists, observing the economy￿ s computational processes, impute com-
putability properties to the economy? Analogous to Guckenheimer￿ s thought ex-
periment, if the data set generated by the economy as a computer is recursively
enumerable but not recursive, inferences about the computability properties of
the economy will remain incomplete. On the other hand, if we ￿as observers
￿feed the economy with data sets that are also recursively enumerable but not
recursive, then whether the economy, as a computer, will be able to process it
in a de￿nitive way will remain unknown for an indeterminate period.
Whether de￿nitive knowledge of the structure of the economy can be ob-
tained by observing its processes will depend on the metaphors we use to char-
acterise it; for example, characterising the economy as a ￿nite automaton or a
dynamical system whose limit sets are stable limit points makes it easy to infer
structural properties by observations of the outcome of its processes. This is
the standard approach to modelling and inference of economic dynamics.
In the computable approach to economics, the starting point is that the
economy is a Turing Machine and the data it generates forms a set that is
recursively enumerable but not recursive. If so, what can be inferred about the
structure of the economy may only be explored by Turing Machine computation,
without any guarantee that a de￿nitive answer will be obtained.
Computation in economics becomes epistemologically meaningful only when
the economic modeller, using computational metaphors to analyse the data gen-
erated by the economy, begins to accept, at least pro tempore, that the economy,
its constituents and its institutions are themselves computers. This is the nat-
ural mode of interaction between the economy and the classical behavioural
economist ￿i.e., Herbert Simon￿ s version of behavioural economics (see [77])
￿and the computable economist (see [78]); it is not the natural mode for the
CGE theorist, nor for the agent-based computational economist. This is why
45A reader, equipped with the standard knowledge of classical recursion theory, would
immediately invoke the distinction between recursive and recursively enumerable sets to make
precise sense of this important observation.
34there is a serious epistemological de￿cit in the practice of the latter two classes
of economists.
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